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FAMILY LAW 
GEORGE J. ALEXANDER 
The most important events of this year in family law concerned 
divorce. In the wake of an Alabama decision, New York litigants waited 
anxiously to see whether the rule which barred later collateral attack by 
parties to a foreign divorce had been swept away. The issue was before 
the courts, but only forecasts of the answer were available. Another out­
of-state divorce, that by the governor's wife, brought a storm of protest 
against the New York divorce law. Aside from these events, the Family 
Court Act was passed as part of the court reorganization scheme. I t, also, 
promised considerable change. 
I 
MATRIMONIAL ACTIONS 
Marriage and Annulment.-A rather touching case is presented in 
the application of Honore E. Kiellman1 in which the petitioner, "a lady 
now past 50 years of age," requested permission for her fourth venture 
into matrimony despite an injunction dating from the termination of her 
first marriage presumably on statutory grounds.2 The lady in question, 
now more concerned about the injunction than she was in her last two 
marriages which were performed out of state, requested modification of 
the decree to allow a new alliance. Departing from the uncharitable 
standard of Spinks v. Spinks,3 the court found the two out-of-state mar­
riages not inconsistent with the "uniformly good" conduct4 standard to be 
applied on applications of this sort. Finding it unnecessary to make a 
determination of petitioner'S morality, and finding the moral issue satis­
factorily settled anyway, since she attached "a Latin document signed by 
the Chancery of her church" attesting to the valid dissolution of her prior 
marriages,!; the court granted the motion. According to Justice Brenner, 
the statutory good conduct standard merely requires that the conduct in 
the period under consideration should be such as not to "break down the 
institution of marriage."o) Applying that standard, Justice Brenner con­
cluded that "provided she does not molest an already married man, she 
may, through successive marriages, conceivably promote the institution of 
marriage."7 The injunction against remarriage is, as a practical matter, 
George J. Alexander is Assistant Professor of Law at the Syracuse University College 
of Law and a Member of the Illinois and New York Bars. 
1. Kiellman v. Kiellman, 28 Misc. 2d 717, 216 N.Y.S.2d 197 (Sup. Ct., Kings Co. 1961). 
2. N.Y. Civ. Prac. Act § Il47. 
3. 43 N.Y.S.2d 418 (Sup. Ct., Bronx Co. 1943). 
4. N.Y. Dom. ReI. Law § 8. 
5. 28 Misc. 2d at 719, 216 N.Y.S.2d at 199. 
6. Ibid. 
7. Ibid. 
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unenforceable; out-of-state marriages are recognized as valid although 
consumated in violation ot injunctive provisions.s In the context of 
these legal facts, a graver approach to the problem seems unwarranted. 
Annulments are still being liberally awarded,9 as contrasted with the 
harshness of single-ground divorce decrees. There are, of course, limi­
tations. Although it is clear that fraud as to the mental health of one of 
the parties to the marriage may be sufficient ground for an annulment,to 
it has not been clear since Smith v. Smith!! how much candor is required 
with respect to the immediate relatives of the parties. Facing that prob­
lem, the court in Hameister v. Hameister,12 ruled that concealment as to 
the mental condition of "V's mother was insufficient grounds for annulment. 
An action to annual a marriage on the ground of fraud was com­
menced by a party who died during the period between the interlocutory 
and final judgments. Considering the survival of such an action, the 
fourth department held that Section 1139 of the Civil Practice Act de· 
manded the entry of the final judgment as a matter of course, consequently 
disinheriting the ex-wife.13 In light of the survival of action provisions 
of Section 82 of the Civil Practice Act, when read with Section 1139 which 
allows an action to annul a marriage on the ground of fraud by relatives 
after the death of a party to the marriage, the decision seems sound. The 
opposite holding would merely require substituting the relatives of the 
decedent in the same action, a formality, which, after the issuance of the 
interlocutory judgment, seems unnecessary. 
Finally, Shepetin v. Shepetin14 held that failure to have sexual inter­
course, although a ground for separation when willful,!5 is not otherwise 
a ground. Since separation actions are authorized only for a specifed list 
of misconducts,16 a refusal to order separation for unwilled abstinence 
seems correct. Assuming that the impotence to which the court refers did 
not pre-exist the marriage, H & W are remanded to their sexless marriage, 
since annulment, under those circumstances, is also unavailable.17 
Divorce.-Two actions of great potential affect on New York divorce 
law were occasioned by New York residents in other states. The governor's 
wife duplicated the pilgrimage taken by many of her husband's con­
stituents18 and procured an order terminating her marriage.19 The imme-
8. Thorpe v. Thorpe, 90 N.Y. 602 (1882). 
9. See, e.g., Annulment of Marriage in New York for Fraud Based upon Religious 
Factors, 30 Fordham L. Rev. 776 (1962). 
10. Goldsmith v. Goldsmith, 279 App. Div. 579, 107 N.Y.S.2d 691 (1st Dep't 1951). 
11. 112 Misc. 371, 184 N.Y. Supp. 134 (Sup. Ct., Kings Co. 1920). 
12. 28 Misc. 2d 796, 216 N.Y.S.2d 436 (Sup. Ct., Herkimer Co. 1961). 
13. Matter of Estate of Haney, 14 App. Div. 2d 121, 217 N.Y.S.2d 324 (4th Dep't 1961). 
14. 16 App. Div. 2d 948, 229 N.Y.S.2d 457 (2d Dep't 1962). 
15. Diemer v. Diemer, 8 N.Y.2d 206, 168 N.E.2d 654, 203 N.Y.S.2d 829 (1960). 
16. N.Y. Civ. Prac. Act § 1161. 
17. Anonymous v. Anonymous, 49 N.Y.S.2d 314 (Sup. Ct., Bronx Co. 1944). 
18. Some concept of the volume is afforded in an excellent book published this 
year. Blake, The Road to Reno, at 171 (1962). 
19. N.Y. Times, March 17, 1962, p. 1, col. 2. 
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diate reaction to her action was public recoil from the archaic New York 
provisions which presumably occasioned the journey. 20 The other notable 
e.xcursion was taken by the Hartigans to Alabama in order to contest 
modification of a previous divorce decree. In the aftermath of their case,21 
in which the court on its own motion vacated the original divorce on the 
ground of the fraudulent claim of Alabama residence, the law of New 
York has been in some turmoil. The intervening year and a half since that 
decision has produced no reported case in this state taking a definitive 
position on the relationship of that ruling to previously settled principles. 
Before the case, parties to an action for divorce were barred from denying 
its validity in this state, when they were personally represented in the prior 
action.22 It is, of course, still true that where the appearance of one of 
the parties in the foreign divorce was procured through fraud or coercion, 
estoppel does not apply. 23 Facing the problem more squarely, two courts 
have suggested alternative accommodations. In Sommer v. Sommer,24 the 
appellate division affirmed the dismissal of a declaratory judgment action 
seeking invalidation of an Alabama decree, but added the sage suggestion 
that petitioner "may be able to obtain similar or related relief in another 
jurisdiction."25 In Bard v. Bard,26 a similar action seeking a declaration 
of the invalidity of an Alabama divorce, the court refused W's motion to 
dismiss on procedural grounds but added, "moreover, even if the plaintiff 
voluntarily appeared in the divorce action, it may be that the holding in 
Boxer v. Boxer . . .  and similar cases will have to be re-examined in the 
light of Hartigan v. Hartigan . . . . "21 
The prediction of the Bard case seems well founded. Boxer v. Boxer2s 
relied primarily on Sherrer v. Sherrer,29 which bars collateral attack on a 
judgment of a sister state when such attack is not open to citizens of the 
sister state. Shen-er merely limits the extent of collateral challenge per­
missible; it does not require that any be allowed. Consequently, it would 
be open to New York to retain the Boxer rule for different reasons. Since 
20. See, e.g., editorial, Divorce Law Fictions, N.Y. Times, March 17, 1962, p. 24, col. 2.  
For a more definitive attack, unrelated to the incident in question, see Blake, The Road 
to Reno (1962). 
21. Hartigan v. Hartigan, 272 Ala. 67, 128 So. 2d 725 (1961). 
22. Boxer v. Boxer, 7 App. Div. 2d 1001, 184 N.Y.S.2d 303 (2d Dep't), alI'd, 7 N.Y.2d 
781, 163 N.E.2d 149, 194 N.Y.S.2d 47 (1959). 
23. Bard v. Bard, 16 App. Div. 2d 801, 228 N.Y.S.2d 294 (2d Dep't 1962). 
2·1. 16 App. Div. 2d 629, 226 N.Y .s.2d 730 (1st Dep't 1962). 
25. Id. at 629, 226 N.Y.S.2d at 731. On remand, special term refused to consider the 
effect of the Hartigan decision, holding that matter to have been settled by the appellate 
division's affirmance of the dismissal of the declaratory judgment action. Sommer v. 
Sommer, 232 N.Y.S.2d 558 (Sup. Ct., N.Y. Co. 1962). 
26. 29 Misc. 2d 453, 219 N.Y.S.2d 493 (Sup. Ct., Nassau Co. 1961), alI'd, 16 App. 
Div. 2d 801, 228 N.Y.S.2d 294 (2d Dep't 1962). 
27. Id. at 454, 219 N.y.s.2d at 494. 
28. 7 App. Div. 2d 1001, 184 N.Y.S.2d 303 (2d Dep't), alI'd, 7 N.Y.2d 781, 163 
N.E.2d 149, I!H N.Y.S.2d 47 (1959). 
29. 334 U.S. 343 (1948). 
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Alabama has become a notorious divorce haven, however, it is not unlikely 
that the court will adopt a rule sanctioning collateral attack by a spouse 
in a New York proceeding despite his participation in the Alabama action. 
The impact of the case will primarily crush those who have relied on pre­
existing law. It is to be assumed that the ultimate effect of the case, unless 
other states adopt the Hartigan rule, will be merely to divert the divorce 
business from Alabama to, for example, Nevada. The practical effect on 
parties previously "divorced" in Alabama is yet one more result of a divorce 
law incompatible with national mores. Another shocking spawn of the 
same law is Sackler v. Sackler30 more fully discussed in this Survey in the 
evidence section, in which the appellate division felt compelled to allow 
introduction of evidence of adultery procured by H in an unlawful entry 
of W's residence. It is little wonder that, in a state in which a method 
of obtaining judicial approbation for a divorce consists of battering down 
doors with allies who can testify to W's indiscretion, out-of-state divorces 
have become a normal modus operandi. 
Mexican divorces were also being challenged. In Busk v. Busk31 the 
court held that irrespective of the validity of a Mexican divorce terminat­
ing a second marriage, such a decree could not validate an otherwise in­
valid Mexican mail-order divorce for H's first marriage. Recognizing the 
rule of Statter v. Statter,32 that a valid adjudication of separation includes 
an adjudication of the validity of the prior marriage, the court, nonethe­
less, held such principle inapplicable to Mexican divorces. 
II 
SEPARATION AGREEMENTS AND ALIMONY 
Separation Agreements.-This year a number of separation agreements 
proved themselves more perdurable than expected. Following the Court 
of Appeals mandate in Borax v. Borax,33 which barred a judicial action 
for separation during the pendency of a valid separation agreement, a 
court had little difficulty in dismissing an action by W, party to such an 
agreement, to the extent that it sought separation.34 The court refused, 
understandably, to read the standard separation agreement provision. 
that the terms of the contract may be incorporated into a judgment of 
separation or divorce, as in any manner negating the continuation of the 
underlying agreement. In Brownstein v. Brownstein,35 another court 
carried this reasoning one step further and refused to honor an express 
30. 16 App. Div. 2d 423, 229 N.y.s.2d 61 (2d Dep't 1962). 
31. 229 N.Y.S.2d 904 (Sup. Ct., Nassau Co. 1962). 
32. 2 N.Y.2d 668, 143 N.E.2d 10, 163 N.Y.S.2d 13 (1957). 
33.4 N.Y.2d 1I3, 149 N.E.2d 326, 172 N.Y.S.2d 805 (1958). 
34. Cohen v. Cohen, 28 Misc. 2d 558, 212 N.Y.S.2d 809 (Sup. Ct., Bronx Co. 1961). 
35. 34 Misc. 2d 1097, 229 N.Y.S.2d 463 (Sup. Ct., N.Y. Co. 1962). 
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provision in the separation agreement allo'wing an action for separation.36 
While the Borax decision is probably necessary in order to validate the 
contractual terms of the agreement, which might othenvise be subject to 
repudiation at the parties' whims, it is not clear why the same result 
should apply in circumstances in which the signatories expressly refused 
to limit themselves to the negotiated terms, presumably because of a 
wariness concerning the arrangement.37 
The Hartigans, who have already made a major contribution to 
national domestic relations law,3s also contributed to proving the longevity 
of separation agreements. Despite a five-year hiatus in the operation of a 
5eparation agreement, which had, apparently, been superseded by a divorce 
decree, a court ruled that merger of the separation agreement did not 
occur and that it was consequently valid and subsisting when the inter­
vening divorce was invalidated.39 Of course, where the parties expressly 
contract to terminate the support provisions of an agreement on a given 
date, expressly leaving the wife such judicial remedy as is available, the 
remaining sections, whether they still constitute a "separate agreement" 
or not, are a bar to a separation action.40 
The question remains: what is the status of the remaining terms of an 
agreement where the support provisions have been terminated by con­
tractual agreement or judicial intervention? When a separation agreement 
has been invalidated for contravention of Section 51 of the Domestic 
Relations Law, as relieving the husband of his duty to support his wife, 
courts have, despite this fact, enforced releases and waivers contained in 
the agreement.41 When the judicial invalidation is attributable to another 
portion of section 51, which prohibits a contract to alter or dissolve a 
marriage, no previously reported case appears to have enforced any provi­
sions of the agreement. The first department, however, by a three-to-two 
vote, has now ruled that mutual waivers of the right to share in the 
estate of the other spouse survive a separation agreement otherwise nullified 
as a contract to invalidate a marriage. The analogy made by the court 
to the duty of support cases seems strained. In the cases in which the 
courts found the husband remiss in the measure of support, they have 
excised the support provisions, substituted their own judgment and 
determined the fairness of the old provisions in the new context. Ultimate 
36. "Nothing in this agreement shall bar the institution of any action for separation 
by either party." Id. at 1098, 229 N.Y.S.2d at 464. 
37. But see Stoddard Y. Stoddard, 227 N.Y. 13, 124 N.E. 90 (1919) (refusing to en­
furce contractual provision for redetermination of support payments); Carluccio Y. Car­
luccio, 22 Misc. 2d 854, 198 N.Y.S.2d 596 (Sup. Ct., Queens Co. 1960). 
38. See Note 21 supra and accompanying text. 
:m. Hartigan Y. Hartigan, 30 Misc. 2d 949, 219 N.Y.S.2d 92 (Sup. Ct., N.Y. Co. 1961), 
mudified on other grounds, 16 App. Div. 2d 145, 226 N.Y.S.2d 31 (1st Dep't 1962). 
40. Stampler Y. Stampler, 224 N.Y.S.2d 185 (Sup. Ct., Nassau Co. 1961). 
41. Schiff v. Schiff, 270 App. Div. 845, 60 N.Y.S.2d 318 (2d Dep't 1946); Hoops v. 
Hoops, 266 App. Div. 512, 42 N.Y.S.2d 635 (1st Dep't 1943). 
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fairness to the wife was all that had to be accomplished. In the contract­
to-tenninate-a-marriage cases, such as the one now considered, however. 
the reason for invalidation differs. The contract is unenforceable because 
the underlying consideration is unlawful. No readjustment of financial 
provisions can transform it into a mere contract for support. Indeed, on 
the instant facts, a strong case can be made for the dissent's suggestion 
that, even accepting the majority's rule, the waivers enforced should not 
have survived on contract principles. 
It has long been settled in this state42 that willful breach of visitation 
privileges by VV suspends H's contractual duty of support. The policy is 
apparently salutary. Indeed, within this year one court has indicated 
reluctance in applying the provisions of an Arizona judgment where 
there had allegedly been a willful denial of visitation rights, despite its 
recognition of a rule requiring independent application of the support­
based judgment.43 Feeling constrained by prior decisions, the court none­
theless enforced the foreign judgment.44 It is apparently error, however, 
for a court to condition support payments on visitation privileges where 
the children themselves resist the visitation.45 
In any event, before relying on the terms of a separation agreement 
relating to visitation rights as a justification for the suspension of support 
payments, one would be well advised to scrutinize the agreement in ques­
tion. In Kuniholm v. Kuniholm,46 the Court of Appeals rejected the deci­
sions of special term and the Appellate Division, First Department, that 
a question of fact existed with respect to the visitation provisions of the 
separation agreement. The agreement in question provided that H's 
infant children should not be removed from the continental United States 
and, in addition, that H should have the right to visit the children at 
mutually agreeable times and specifically during Easter, Christmas, and 
for two weeks during the summer. W's daughter accompanied her on a 
two-year foreign assignment. H subsequently defended an action to recover 
support payments on several grounds, including breach of visitation 
rights. The Court of Appeals held that no question of fact existed, the 
daughter not having been "permanently" removed and the rights to 
visitation having remained unaffected. A number of factors suggest that 
the Court of Appeals reached the appropriate result in this case. The 
wife had sought pemission; her letters were ignored. At the time the 
agreement was signed, the wife was apparently already employed in the 
occupation which led to her overseas assignment. The daughter alleged 
that she had taken the matter up with her father and he had indicated 
42. Duryea v. Bliven, 122 N.Y. 567, 25 N.E. 908 (1890). 
43. Lynde v. Lynde, 162 N.Y. 405, 56 N.E. 979 (1900), ali'd, 181 U.S. 18!! (1901). 
44. Greene v. Greene, 31 Misc. 2d 1009, 221 N.Y.S.2d 236 (Sup. Ct., Monroe Co. 1961). 
45. Babin v. Babin, 16 App. Div. 2d 884, 228 N.Y.S.2d 434 (4th Dep't 1962). 
46. II N.Y.2d 358, 183 N.E.2d 692, 229 N.Y.S.2d 412 (1962). 
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no OppOSItIOn. The disturbing aspect of the OpInIOn, however, is the 
court's suggestion that the result follows from the agreement. The court 
found that the voluntary trip by the twenty-year-old girl for a two-year 
period was not a permanent removal from the United States, without 
making it clear whether this result followed from the girl's maturity, the 
voluntary nature of the trip, or the temporary nature of a two-year period. 
More disturbing is the suggestion that, in any event, a trip abroad would 
not interfere with the husband's "right of visitation,"47 thereby seemingly 
suggesting that a right of visitation is available irrespective of its geo­
graphical impracticability. 
The importance of good draftsmanship in separation agreements was 
also suggested by the decision in Taus v. Taus48 where the court held that 
an agreement to pay $70 per week for support of the wife and children 
during their minority committed H to pay $70 per week after the children 
attained majority since no reduced payment was specifically provided for 
such an event. 
Alimon)I.-Alimony criteria have undergone some refinement in the 
past year. In Newburger v. Newburger,49 the court held that the applicable 
level of support in annulment cases differs from the support standard 
to be applied following divorce or separation. \<\Tithout articulating the 
new standard to be applied, the court appears to have sought the middle 
ground between the level of preseparation living and the wife's premarital 
"menial income," reasoning that it would not be justified in awarding 
alimony on the divorce or separation standards, there being neither proof 
of fault nor a continuing marital relationship to which such standard 
would relate. Since H in this case obtained the annulment from W be­
cause of fault on her part, the result is not harsh. \<\Tere the roles reversed, 
however, the suggestion of the court that the standard would be less than the 
preseparation standard since there had never been a valid marriage, would 
seem undesirable. 
Another case suggested that the preseparation standard may be in­
adequate as a gauge of the level of alimony, even where it is substantially 
above the level required to keep the wife from becoming a public charge. 
In Hunter v. HunterGO the court found that both husband and wife had 
diligently applied themselves to H's career and he had, at the pinnacle 
of his success, left his spouse for another. Under these circumstances, the 
court held the wife entitled to share in the standard the couple would 
have achieved considering his potential future earnings. However salutary 
such a rule may be, especially under the facts of the Hunter case where 
47. Emphasis added by the court. Id. at 361, 183 N.E.2d at 695, 229 N.Y.S.2d at 415. 
48. 35 Misc. 2d 396, 229 N.Y.S.2d 124 (Sup. Ct., App. T., 1st Dep't 1962). 
49. 228 N.Y.S.2d 323 (&up. Ct., Westch. Co. 1961). 
• 
50. 30 Misc. 2d 776, 216 N.Y.S.2d 711 (Sup. Ct., N.Y. Co. 1961), aff'd, 15 App. Diy. 2d 
821, 226 N.Y.S.2d 675 (1st Dep't 1962). 
HeinOnline -- 14 Syracuse L. Rev. 340 1962-1963
340 SYRACUSE LAW REVIEW 
the marriage lasted nineteen years, it is questionable whether the standard 
described was actually applied. The alimony awarded was $20,000 per 
annum, but even this generous amount could be justified on the income at 
the time of separation (which, according to court figures, was slightly less 
than $84,000) and need not relate to H's income at the time of trial (over 
$111,000). Of course, the standard is easier to articulate than to apply. 
The wrangling over appropriate amounts for temporary and perma· 
nent alimony continues unabated in the courts. This year, as in the past. 
appellate courts have been required to review alimony awards and the 
review has turned up startling results. In iliack v. Mack,rJ1 the fourth 
department reversed alimony payments of $24,000 plus additional benefits 
to be paid by a husband whose income after taxes was $25,000. 
At least one voice has been raised against the extent of appeal allowed 
on temporary alimony awards. Justice Eager, dissenting in Wexler v. 
Wexler,1;2 would refuse to consider the sufficiency of temporary alimony 
awards if there were some support for the determination below and would 




Adoption.-May a foster parent abrogate an adoption because of his 
inability to support his adopted child? This issue was raised in Matter of 
Anonymous.53 After ruling against allegations of fraud in the initial adop­
tion proceeding, the court held that the statutory grounds in Section I 17 
of the Domestic Relations Law;;4 which allow a foster child "or any person" 
on "behalf of such child" to abrogate on several grounds, among them: 
"inability or refusal to support, maintain, or educate the child," were 
designed exclusively for the benefit of the child and could not be invoked 
by the foster parent. The decision is a salutary recognition of the perma­
nence of foster parental relations. 
Custody.-In the child custody cases, the major problem remains the 
reneging parent. Although both the Social Welfare Law and Domestic 
Relations Law provide expressly for waiving parental consent to the place­
ment of children where the children have been "abandoned,"i)o abandon­
ment continues to be an elusive concept with the odds strongly in favor of 
the natural parent. In Matter of Lewis,56 the court refused to commit two 
children to a welfare agency under Section 384 of the Social 'Welfare Law. 
although both had been placed with the Department of 'Welfare on birth 
51. 16 App. Div. 2d 1029, 230 N.Y.S.2d 112 (4th Dep't 1962). 
52. 15 App. Div. 2d 451, 221 N.Y.S.2d 737 (1st Dep't 1961). 
53. 29 Misc. 2d 580, 213 N.Y.S.2d 10 (SUIT. Ct., Nassau Co. 1961). 
54. Now N.Y. Dom. ReI. Law § 1I8-a. 
55. N.Y. Soc. Welfare Law § 884-e; N.Y. Dom. ReI. Law § Ill. 
56. 35 Misc. 2d 117, 230 N.Y.S.2d 481 (SUIT. Ct., N.Y. Co. 1962). 
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and had remained under foster care for four and three years respectively. 
The decision negated abandonment by the mother who had apparently 
not visited either child more than three times, the last visit in both cases 
being two years prior to the institution of the action in question. The 
court suggested that the mother's lack of visitation was in part due to 
active interference by the welfare agency and that other factors explained 
her absence. Finally, the court concluded that the appropriate abandon­
ment standard requires a willfulness which must be more than neglect 
caused by illness due to temporary mental disturbance. What is most 
llbturbing about the case is that it seems reasonably evident that the 
mother was not seeking custody of the children but was merely seeking 
to prevent placing the children for adoption. Indeed, the court charac­
terized her as "emotionally and perhaps mentally disturbed.";;7 If abandon­
ment requires more than temporary emotional disturbance and if emotional 
disturbance of over five years, as in this case, is temporary, one wonders 
under what circumstances the cllild of a person mentally ill could ever find 
a permanent home. The Court of Appeals in Isaac v. GreenbergaS also 
refused to find abandonment in the father's placement of his daughter 
with his mother and grandmother for a period of over six years while he 
�erved in the Navy. Only Judge Van Voorhis seemed shocked at the effect 
on the daughter. 
Abandonment was, however, found in one Court of Appeals case.59 
In that case the mother gave her four-day-old child to foster parents, via 
an intermediary. For the next three years she made no inquiries as to his 
whereabouts. Under these circumstances, a divided Court of Appeals 
found her to have abandoned her child. The judges who concurred in the 
opinion of the court may have been somewhat persuaded by the resolution 
of the other issue in the case, the fitness of the mother to raise the child. 
On the fitness issue, the court found that the foster parents had proven 
the mother's "sexual promiscuity at the age of 13 and ... indulgence at 
16 in both normal and abnormal sex relations with a married man over 
a period of several months while separated from her husband . .. . "60 Even 
on these facts, however, only a bare majority of the court could be mustered 
for permanently depriving the mother of her child. Two judges, in a 
concurring opinion, suggested that if the mother would mend her ways, 
she should later be allowed to institute new proceedings for custody. Chief 
Judge Desmond would have given her immediate custody of the child. 
It is, of course, difficult to accommodate the right of a natural parent 
to his child and the policy of protecting the child's welfare. One com-
37. Itl. at 119, 230 N.Y.S.2d at 483. 
58. 11 N.Y.2d 869, 183 N.E.2d 290, 227 N.Y.S.2d 683 (1962). 
:;9. Anonymous v. Anonymous, 10 N.Y.2d 332, 179 N.E.2d 200, 222 N.Y.S.2d 945 (1961). 
60. Id. at 336, 179 N.E.2d at 201, 222 N.Y.S.2d at 947. 
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promise is suggested by Laub v. CaltobeZotia61 in which the court expressly 
refused to find abandonment in a case in which the child had been left 
with grandparents for almost all of his twelve years and granted custody 
to the mother on condition that the infant continue to reside with the 
grandparents. 
Custody hearings: off-the-record information.-The use of reports by 
courts in custody cases, when those reports have not been shown to the 
attorneys, continues as a problem. In Matter of Zebo,62 the fourth depart­
ment, over a strong dissent by Presiding Justice Williams, affirmed a case 
in which the trial court had studied a probation department report that 
had not been shown to the attorneys. The next day the Court of Appeals 
reversed the authority primarily relied on by the appellant in Zebo by 
deciding Kesseler v. KesseZer.63 In KesseZer, Judge Van Voorhis, writing 
for the majority, addressed himself to a resolution of the major problems 
respecting the use of confidential information by the court. Specifically, 
it was held that the confidential use of psychiatric reports, without stipula­
tion of the parties, was reversible error despite the fact that the appellate 
division had found that the record fully supported the judgment without 
reference to the objectionable material. On the other hand, insofar as the 
parties had stipulated to the submission of a report by the family counselor 
attached to the court, no error had been committed in refusing to show 
the report to the parties. The rule appears to be a clear one: without 
stipulation of the parties, the judge is not entitled, in custody proceedings, 
to use information obtained by means incompatible with the adversary 
process. Where the parties are willing to agree to exceptions, for example, 
a private interview between the judge and the child or the confidential use 
of professional reports, the reception of the resulting information is entirely 
proper although the parties have not been apprised of its content. The court 
did suggest that, even absent stipulation, a trial court might call upon 
qualified experts to examine the infant and consenting parents. The court­
appointed expert would then be available to either party. Calling of such 
an expert appears to exhaust the court's power to take independent means 
of acquiring information. Judge Van Voorhis' lucid opinion should go far 
in resolving any remaining doubt concerning independent judicial inquiry 
in custody cases. The later memorandum affirmance of Zebo indicates, how­
ever, that it is not as yet reversible error for a judge to receive non-evi· 
dentiary reports confidentially where only reception has been stipulated. 
Children's Rights and Status.-In the matter of parent-child suits, the 
trend continues in the direction of the Badigian case64 criticized in last 
61. 33 Misc. 2d 397, 219 N.Y.S.2d 363 (Sup. Ct., Nassau Co. 1961). 
62. 15 App. Div. 2d 726, 223 N.Y.S.2d 227 (4th Dep't), alI'd, 11 N.Y.2d 771, 181 
N.E.2d 766, 227 N.Y.S.2d 22 (l962). 
63. 10 N.Y.2d 445, 180 N.E.2d 402, 225 N.Y.S.2d 1 (1962). 
64. Badigian v. Badigian, 9 N.Y.2d 472, 174 N.E.2d 718, 215 N.Y.S.2d 35 (1961). 
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year's survey.6� In St. Croix v. St. Croix66 the appellate division reversed 
the trial court determination that, as a matter of law, a child who had been 
removed from his parental home by order of the children's court (although 
he resided with his parents from time to time by permission) was emanci­
pated and could, consequently, recover damages from a parent for negligent 
injury. If an infant stands a poor chance of recovery against a parent for 
accidental injury, at least a tort recovery seems barred from seizure by the 
Director of Public 'Welfare for use in support of the infant or his parents.67 
Admitting the applicability of Sections 101 and 104 of the Social Welfare 
Law, which make an infant liable under some circumstances for his parents' 
support, a court, in so concluding, relied on a line of cases suggesting the 
sanctity of personal injury recoveries. It is difficult to quarrel with the 
proposition that a crippled infant may be more in need of the money at his 
majority than the public treasury. 
As to the status of children born of void marriages, a case of first im­
pression has allowed a surrogate to legitimatize a child of a void marriage 
when the marriage was held void as an incident to probate proceedings 
in the surrogate's court.68 While Section 1135 of the Civil Practice Act ex· 
pressly grants the power to legitimatize children of a void marriage only 
in connection with annulment actions, the court reasoned that an an­
nulment action would be impossible because of the death of one of the 
parties.6� In light of the social policy favoring legitimization it held the 
surrogate's action proper. As a matter of statutory interpretation, the result 
may be doubted; as a matter of public policy, it seems unimpeachable. 
IV 
MISCELLANEA 
A ta.xpayer who had left his wife and thereafter defeated her action 
for separation in this state, has been excluded from the "head of house­
hold" category of Section 1(2)(b) of the Internal Revenue Code.7o "What­
ever else his status, he is not a person "legally separated from his spouse 
under a decree of divorce or separate maintenance" and consequently must 
pay income ta.x as a single person.71 It should also be noted that whatever 
demerit there is to a meritricious relationship does not carry over into 
insurance law. In United States Fire Ins. Co. v. Cruzp the lady in question, 
65. Goebel &: Rashap, Family Law, 1961 Survey of N.Y. Law, 36 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 1549, 
1559 (1961). 
66. 17 App. Div. 2d 692, 229 N.Y.S.2d 969 (4th Dep't 1962). 
67. Woods v. Mason, 32 Misc. 2d 745, 222 N.y.s.2d 903 (Sup. Ct., Onondaga Co. 1961). 
68. Matter of Newins, 16 App. Div. 2d 436, 229 N.Y.s.2d 279 (2d Dep't 1962). 
69. It is not clear why annulment could not be declared posthumously under N.Y. 
Civ. Prac. Act § 1139 unles the "wife" of the void marriage had knowledge of the prior 
marriage. 
7Q. Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 1 (2) (B). 
71. Wesemann v. Commissioner, 298 F.2d 527 (2d Cir. 1962). 
72. 35 Mise. 2d 272, 230 N.Y.S.2d 779 (Sup. Ct., N.Y. Co. 1962). 
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who lived with and had children by a man without the benefit of marriage, 
collected on an insurance policy which would have been unavailable to a 
wife because of Section 167(3) of the Insurance Law.73 Since she was not "a 
spouse" of the insured within the meaning of the statute, the insurer was 
held liable. The parties considered themselves husband and wife, and 
would, but for the abolition of common-law marriage,74 probably have 
been held to be spouses. The opposite result in Cruz would seem permissi­
ble as a matter of statutory interpretation and certainly permissible from 
the standpoint of probable legislative intent. Since insurers are likely to 
close the gap created by this case, it will probably be relegated to a con­
versation piece. 
New Legislation.-The only legislative change of general applicability 
is the establishment, effective September I of this year, of a state family 
court, in accordance with the Family Court Act.75 Rules applicable to the 
state-wide family court have been issued by the Administrative Board of 
the Judicial Conference. The Family Court Act is designed to give a single 
court (the family court) jurisdiction over related matters of family life en­
compassing most intrafamilial legal problems except separations, an­
nulments and divorce (which are reserved to the supreme court). In mat­
ters of neglect, support, paternity, family offenses and juvenile proceedings, 
the jurisdiction of the court is exclusive.76 In adoption, its jurisdiction will 
become exclusive on September 1, 1964, being until that time concurrent 
with the surrogate's court.77 
A few provisions appear especially worthy of note. The first relates to 
law guardians78 which are established to assist minors in neglect proceed­
ings, juvenile delinquency proceedings, and proceedings to determine the 
need of supervision of minors. In addition, Section 241 contains the salu­
tary provision declaring the right to counsel for minors in these proceed­
ings. Because of the suggested permissibility of utilizing the Legal Aid So­
ciety as law guardian,79 a number of such societies will presumably become 
significantly involved in the application of the new act. Certain to cause 
more difficulty are two other parts of the act. One of them deals with con­
ciliation proceedings80 over which the court has original jurisdiction. Sec­
tions 924 and 925 allow a court, after hearing, to order parties to attend 
reconciliation proceedings. Section 926 terminates such proceedings, except 
on consent of both spouses, after ninety days. It is not clear whether, at the 
73. "No policy . . . shall be deemed to insure against any liability of an insured 
because of death of or injuries to his . . spouse [unless the contract expressly provides 
otherwise]." N.Y. Ins. Law § 167(3). 
74. N.Y. Dom. ReI. Law § II. 
75. N.Y. Sess. Laws 1962, chs. 686, 687, 700, 702, and 703. 
76. N.Y. Family Ct. Act § 115. 
77. N.Y. Family Ct. Act § 64I. 
78. N.Y. Family Ct. Act §§ 241-49. 
79. N.Y. Family Ct. Act § 243. 
80. N.Y. Family Ct. Act §§ 911-26. 
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end of that time, a new petition may be brought. There will, no doubt, be 
difficulty in effectuating the conciliation proceeding. The parties, forced 
to confer, may be hostile to the proceedings. Time lost in attendance may 
make conferences an effective sanction against errant husbands. It will 
take time for the court to accustom itself to the procedure and to work 
out the necessary accommodation with the probation service and the volun­
tary agencies which are to handle the proceedings. All this notwithstanding, 
if the availability of this procedure diverts claims which would othenvise be 
brought in criminal courts, if it relieves enough marital pressure to save 
some marriages and, especially, if it really reconciles spouses, the procedure 
will fill a distinct present void. 
The other part, considerably broader in scope, is Section 251 which ex­
pressly permits the court, once a petition has been filed under this act, 
to order "any person within its jurisdiction" to be examined by a physician, 
psychiatrist or psychologist "when such an examination will serve the 
purposes of the act," and continues by providing that the court may re­
mand the person for a maximum of thirty days for purposes of such physi­
cal or psychiatric study. That a provision so broadly drafted, allowing 
commitment and examination of so vaguely described a category of people, 
will escape constitutional attack seems unlikely. 
No less novel, if apparently more constitutional, is the transfer of 
jurisdiction over several criminal provisions to the family court under 
Article 8, Family Offenses Proceedings.s1 Under these provisions, criminal 
acts between spouses and between other members of the family "which 
would constitute disorderly conduct or an assault" may be brought in 
proceedings in the family court.82 Functional integration of family prob­
lems seems a desirable aim. 
81. N.Y. Family Ct. Act §§ 8II·16. 
82. People v. Klaff, 231 N.Y.S.2d 875, 35 Misc. 2d 859 (1962), held: only misdemeanor 
assaults transferred to Family Cts.-court denied transfer of felony assault. 
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